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The Impact of EU Law on Access to Scientific Knowledge
The Impact of EU Law on Access
to Scientific Knowledge and the
Standard of Review in National
Environmental Litigation:




This article examines the European Union (EU) legal
requirements contained in secondary law and in the
European courts' case law concerning, firstly, the
standard of review to which national courts must adhere
when deciding matters within the scope of EU law and,
secondly, access to scientific knowledge in environmen-
tal litigation. The article shows that national courts are
limited to an assessment of whether a ``manifest error''
has been committed by the public authorities. However,
it is argued, in order to make that assessment, national
courts have to be empowered, under EU law, to access
the scientific knowledge necessary to review the choices
of the administration.
I. Introduction
The legal regime of the European Union (EU) is based
on a system of decentralized enforcement, whereby the
main responsibility for the application and adjudication
of EU environmental law violations is entrusted to
national authorities and national courts, respectively.1
In this system of decentralized enforcement, in the
absence of EU rules, it is in principle a matter of
national law to designate the competent courts in EU
cases and to determine the applicable procedural rules.2
This approach is generally considered to descend from
the principle of ``national procedural autonomy''. This
principle is, however, not absolute, but is limited by the
principles of effective judicial protection, equivalence
and effectiveness.3 These principles set out minimum
common denominators for national procedural rules,
thereby tracing the ``outer limits''4 of national proce-
dural autonomy while, at the same time, leaving EU
Member States a margin of discretion in defining and
maintaining their own procedural framework. Since
there are no EU harmonized rules concerning the ability
or the duty of national courts to access scientific
knowledge in environmental litigation,5 it is left to the
Member States to set national procedural rules on this
issue. This room for discretion at the national level
implies that national differences remain in the way in
which judges can ± or must, in some Member States ±
review the scientific aspects of decisions taken by
national authorities.6
Two questions arise from the EU's reliance on the
applicable national procedural framework in the
enforcement of EU environmental law: firstly, whether
all national procedural variations are acceptable under
EU law or if, instead, some procedural rules fall below
EU standards and thereby violate the principle of
effective judicial protection. Secondly, the question
arises whether acceptable national differences, by
virtue of their sheer existence, hamper the uniform
enforcement of EU law.
This article examines the EU requirements for
access to scientific knowledge by national courts when
adjudicating EU environmental litigation. By ``access
to scientific knowledge'' one is to understand all
procedural means available to courts, such as the
possibility to engage an independent expert or the
possibility to carry out inspections, through which the
courts seek to understand the technical (e.g., chemical,
biological, physical) aspects of a dispute. The need to
understand the technical elements of a controversy is
particularly salient in environmental litigation, where
* Mariolina Eliantonio, Professor of European and Com-
parative Administrative Law and Procedure (Maastricht
University)
1 J. Jans et al, Europeanisation of Public Law 2nd edn
(Europa Law Publishing, 2015), pp. 13 and ff.
2 Case 33/76, Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG
v. Landwirtschaftskammer fuÈr das Saarland ECLI:EU:C:
1976:188.
3 See Case C-279/09, DEB Deutsche Energiehandels- und
Beratungsgesellschaft mbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland
ECLI:EU:C:2010:811; Joined Cases C-317/08 to C-320/08,
Alassini and Others ECLI:EU:C:2010:146. The principle of
equivalence provides that national procedural rules used to
enforce EU law should not be less favourable than those
used for the enforcement of national law; the principle of
effectiveness requires that national procedural rules not
render the exercise of rights conferred by EU law excessively
difficult or impossible in practice. Finally, national proce-
dural rules should ensure effective judicial protection of
rights conferred by EU law.
4 S. Prechal & R. Widdershoven, ``Redefining the Relation-
ship between `Rewe-effectiveness' and Effective Judicial
Protection'' (2011) 4(2) Review of European Administrative
Law, pp. 31±50, at 46.
5 For a discussion of the existing secondary EU rules
concerning procedural matters, see M. Eliantonio & E.
Muir, ``The proceduralisation of EU law through the
backdoor'' (2015) 8(1) Special Issue of the Review of
European Administrative Law.
6 See on the enforcement of the Environmental Impact
Assessment Directive (Directive 2011/92/EU on the assess-
ment of the effects of certain public and private projects on
the environment [2012] OJ L26/1), F. Grashof, National
Procedural Autonomy Revisited (Europa Law Publishing,
2016), pp. 215 and ff.
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courts are called to adjudicate on legal matters that are
deeply entangled with non-legal assessments. For
instance, to determine the legality of an industrial
permit issued in accordance with the Industrial
Emissions Directive,7 a court may need to examine
whether Best Available Techniques (BAT) in the
sector have been observed.
Before embarking on the analysis, two preliminary
points must be made. Firstly, access to scientific
knowledge is deeply connected with the standard of
review which the courts feel entitled to exercise in their
assessment of complex, technical choices of the
administration. Hence, the analysis of the relevant
EU secondary law and case law requirements will not
focus solely on procedural rules concerning the
availability of technical expertise in environmental
litigation, but also on the intensity of the national
courts' review of decisions in EU cases.
Secondly, the following analysis requires that a
distinction be drawn between ``discretionary choices''
and ``technical choices'' (or, as some legal systems call
it, ``technical discretion'') by EU and national admin-
istrative authorities. This distinction is important,
although not necessarily easily made.8 Discretion stricto
sensu is taken here to mean the process through which
the administration assesses and weighs competing
public interests. ``Technical discretion'', in turn, entails
the assessment, within the framework of set legislative
criteria, of the aspects of the decision-making process
that require expert knowledge (and which may occur
within a legislative framework that ultimately leaves no
actual discretion stricto sensu to the authority). To the
extent that this acquired technical knowledge still leaves
room for choice, the authorities are then authorized to
choose an alternative by exercising their ``technical
discretion''.9 This article is in principle concerned only
with the exercise of ``technical discretion'' on the part of
national authorities, with a specific focus on environ-
mental decision-making.
The article proceeds as follows. Firstly, the Eur-
opean case law on the standard of review applicable
before the national and European courts will be
analyzed. As will be shown below, despite the fact
that the focus of this article lies on judicial review of
environmental decisions before national courts, the
standard of review performed by the European courts
is essential to understanding what EU law requires in
terms of the standard of review applicable before
national courts. Secondly, the analysis will move
towards the EU secondary rules and EU case law
concerning the standard of review and access to
scientific knowledge in the specific field of environ-
mental policy. In this context, the international
requirements provided by the Convention on Access
to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental
Matters (Aarhus Convention)10 will also be discussed.
The article will argue that the requirements imposed
by EU law only provide vague guidance and minimum
denominators, thereby leaving Member States a wide
margin of discretion on the standard of review and the
way to access scientific knowledge when EU environ-
mental law is at stake.
II. The European Case Law on the
Standard of Review and the
Consequences of the ``Upjohn
Equivalence''
2.1. The standard of review required by EU law: Upjohn
In some areas of EU law, secondary provisions
prescribe a specific standard of review and a particular
level of expertise required of national courts.11
However, in most fields of EU law, no specific
standard of review is prescribed and there are no
concrete EU rules on the standard of review for
national courts when the enforcement of Union law is
at stake. According to the principle of national
procedural autonomy, the Member States remain
therefore competent to create and to apply their own
rules on the standard of review, as long as the
principles of effectiveness and equivalence and of
effective judicial protection are complied with.
The Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU) was specifically asked to answer a question
concerning the necessary standard of review in EU law
claims in the case of Upjohn, which concerned the
standard of review used by English courts for the
revocation of medical marketing authorizations.12
7 Directive 2010/75/EU on industrial emissions (integrated
pollution prevention and control) [2010] OJ L334/17.
8 See further on this point, J. Mendes, ``Discretion, Care
and Public Interests in the EU Administration: Probing the
Limits of Law'' (2016) 53(2) Common Market Law Review,
pp. 419±452.
9 Advocate General (AG) Leger calls this form of appraisal
``discretion of `technical' nature'', see Opinion in C-40/03 P,
Rica Foods (Free Zone) NV v. Commission ECLI:EU:C:
2005:93, para. 46; Schimmel and Widdershoven prefer the
term ``margin of appreciation'', see M. Schimmel & R.
Widdershoven, ``Judicial Review after Tetra Laval: Some
Observations from a European Administrative Law Point of
View'', in O. Essens, A. Gerbrandy & S. Lavrijssen (eds),
National Courts and the Standard of Review in Competition
Law and Economic Regulation (Europa Law Publishing,
2009), pp. 51±78, at 65.
10 Available at: http://www.unece.org/env/pp/welcome.html.
11 E.g., in the field of telecommunications: Art. 4(1) of
Directive 2002/21/EC on a Common Regulatory Frame-
work for Electronic Communications Networks and Ser-
vices [2002] OJ L108/33; in the field of asylum: Art. 46(3) of
Directive 2013/32/EU on Common Procedures for Granting
and Withdrawing International Protection [2013] OJ L180/
60. See on this point, J. Jans et al, n. 1 above, p. 400.
12 C-120/97, Upjohn Ltd v. The Licensing Authority estab-
lished by the Medicines Act 1968 and Others ECLI:EU:C:
1999:14.
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According to the Court of Justice, EU law does not
require that national courts must be empowered to
substitute the assessment performed by the public
authority with their own assessment of the facts of the
case.13 As a mere ``negative test'', this stipulation says
nothing about what is positively required of national
courts. The benchmark that the Court set in this case
was its own standard of review in cases concerning
decisions by EU authorities. In Upjohn, the Court used
its own standard of review as a benchmark and stated
that the Union Courts are restricted to:
examining the accuracy of the findings of fact and
law made by the authority concerned and to
verifying, in particular, that the action taken by
that authority is not vitiated by a manifest error or a
misuse of powers and that it did not clearly exceed
the bounds of its discretion.14
According to the Court of Justice, Member State
courts are not required to adopt a more intense
standard of review that the standard observed by the
CJEU itself.15 Interestingly, this is one of the few
procedural areas in which the Court, in the context of
assessing national procedural rules, used EU proce-
dural rules as a benchmark. The CJEU has repeated
this line of argumentation in other cases,16 and it
referred to Upjohn recently in a case concerning access
to environmental information.17
In Upjohn, the Court thus established that the
minimum level of scrutiny for national courts is that of
``manifest error''. In Krankenhaustechnik, a case
concerning public procurement, the Court specified
that it was not ``lawful for Member States to limit
review of the legality of a decision to withdraw an
invitation to tender to mere examination of whether it
was arbitrary''.18 In this sense, the Court seemed to
indicate that a ``manifest error'' assessment involves
closer scrutiny than a determination of arbitrariness.
This position seems to imply that the ``traditional''
English standard of review, whereby decisions are
quashed only if they are ``so unreasonable that no
reasonable authority would have adopted them''19
would fall foul of EU law.20
Whether Upjohn constitutes a minimum denominator
or a uniform benchmark was clarified by the Court of
Justice in Arcor, which concerned a decision in the field
of telecommunications.21 In this case, the German
government and a third party claimed, relying on
Upjohn, that the decisions of the telecommunications
authority constituted complex economic assessments
and that, consequently, the review of national courts
had to be limited to the ``manifest error'' threshold. The
Court, however, made very clear that Upjohn only
constitutes a minimum denominator and, within the
framework of national procedural autonomy, Member
States are free to set their own standards of review in
respect of the decision in question. This entails that the
Court of Justice is aware that different standards of
review exist and considers them all acceptable if they
meet the minimum threshold of ``manifest error''.
Acceptable differences thus inherently remain in the
standards of review when the national authorities take
complex technical decisions in the field of EU law.
While Upjohn does not require full review of
administrative decisions, it is interesting to note that
the Court also added that:
nevertheless, any national procedure for judicial
review of decisions of national authorities revoking
marketing authorisations must enable the court or
tribunal seised of an application for annulment of
such a decision effectively to apply the relevant
principles and rules of Community law when
reviewing its legality.22
This statement too has been repeated on other
occasions.23 Although apparently going beyond the
``manifest error'' threshold in answering the questions
submitted by the national court,24 in the recent East
13 Ibid., para. 33.
14 Ibid., para. 34, emphasis added.
15 Ibid,, para. 35.
16 E.g. Case C-211/03, HLH Warenvertriebs GmbH, and C-
299/03 and C-316/03 to C-318/03, Orthica BV v Bundesre-
publik Deutschland ECLI:EU:C:2005:370, para. 75 ff.
17 C-71/14, East Sussex County Council v Information
Commissioner and Others ECLI:EU:C:2015:656, para. 58.
18 Case C-92/00, Hospital Ingenieure Krankenhaustechnik
Planungs-Gesellschaft mbH (HI) v. Stadt Wien ECLI:EU:
C:2002:379, para. 63.
19 See Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v. Wednes-
bury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223. Paul Craig has observed
that, ``if one takes the Wednesbury test at face-value, there
can be no pretence of any meaningful substantive review
and it is difficult to think of a single real case in which the
facts meet this standard'', see P. Craig, ``The Nature of
Reasonableness Review'' (2013) 66(1) Current Legal Pro-
blems, pp. 131±67, at 161.
20 See A. Ryall, ``Enforcing the Environmental Impact
Assessment Directive in Ireland: The Evolution of the
Standard of Judicial Review'' (2018) Transnational Environ-
mental Law (forthcoming). For a comparative overview of
the different standards of review see, T. Zwart, ``The Scope
of Review of Administrative Action From a Comparative
Perspective'', in O. Essens et al, n. 9 above, pp. 23±37.
Vasiliki (Vicky) Karageorgou ``The Scope of the Review in
Environment-related Disputes in the Light of the Aarhus
Convention and EU Law ± Tensions between Effective
Judicial Protection and National Procedural Authority'' in
Jerzy Jendroska and Magdalena Bar (eds) Procedural
Environmental Rights: Principle X on Theory and Practice
(Intersentia 2018), 229-261.
21 Case C-55/06, Arcor AG & Co. KG v. Bundesrepublik
Deutschland ECLI:EU:C:2008:244.
22 Upjohn, n. 12 above, para 36.
23 Cases C-211/03, HLH Warenvertriebs GmbH, and C-299/
03 and C-316/03 to C-318/03, Orthica BV v. Bundesrepublik
Deutschland ECLI:EU:C:2005:370, para 79.
24 See on this point, M. Eliantonio & F. Grashof, ``C-71/14,
East Sussex County Council v Information Commissioner,
Property Search Group, Local Government Association
(Judgment of 6 October 2015) Case Note'' (2016) 9(1)
Review of European Administrative Law, pp. 35±47.
25 East Sussex County Council, n. 17 above, para 57.
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Sussex case the Court repeated that a Member State
does not act contrary to EU law if it does not provide
for a standard of review that allows for a ``complete
review''.25 However, according to the Court, national
judicial review procedures must enable courts ``to
apply effectively the relevant principles and rules of
EU law''.26
In conclusion, on the basis of Upjohn, the Court of
Justice seems to require that the national courts
exercise a form of review of administrative decisions
which is at least as thorough as that exercised by EU
courts, and that this review should in any case be
sufficient to ensure the effective control by national
courts of national authorities' decisions.
2.2. The consequences of Upjohn and the evolving
standard of review at the EU level
The basis of the CJEU's stance on the required
standard of domestic judicial review is the standard of
review exercised by the European courts, namely the
General Court and the Court of Justice. The EU
requirements for national courts seem therefore to be a
sort of ``moving target'' which may need to be adapted
to the changing approach to review performed at the
European level. Indeed, the standard of review applied
by the European courts seems to have evolved
somewhat in the past years.
The question of the appropriate standard of review
in administrative decision-making has come to the
attention of the European courts in competition cases.
Here the European courts, for example, scrutinize the
decisions of the European Commission, whereby the
latter finds a violation of Article 101 and/or Article
102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU) or declares a concentration compatible
or incompatible with the common market, and is thus
faced with decisions that are the product of so-called
``complex economic assessments''. Although less often
than in competition law, the European courts have
also scrutinized decisions requiring technical assess-
ments in the field of environment and human health.27
As a starting point, the attitude of the CJEU was
one of clear deference to the discretionary choices of
administrative authorities. According to early CJEU
case law, and as indicated by the Court itself in
Upjohn, judicial review should be limited to verifying
``whether the rules on procedure and on the statement
of reasons have been complied with, whether the facts
have been accurately stated, and whether there has
been any manifest error of assessment or misuse of
powers''.28 During this early period, ``review of the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting an adminis-
trative measure is virtually non-existent''.29
The test thus established since the early years, and
still formally in place, is that of ``manifest error''.
However, throughout the years, this initial position of
deference has not prevented the CJEU from carrying
out a rather strict scrutiny of EU administrative
decisions in as far as the establishment of facts is
concerned.30 As Paul Craig has argued, the reference
to the threshold of ``manifest error'' has not changed,
but its scope has evolved throughout time to permit an
increasingly intensive review.31 The standard scope of
review applicable in cases of ``complex economic
assessments'' is the one enunciated in Tetra Laval,32
in which the Court of Justice explained that:
whilst . . . the Commission has a margin of
discretion with regard to economic matters, that
does not mean that the Community Courts must
refrain from reviewing the Commission's interpre-
tation of information of an economic nature.33
On the contrary:
not only must the Community Courts, inter alia,
establish whether the evidence relied on is factually
accurate, reliable and consistent but also whether
the evidence contains all the information which
must be taken into account in order to assess a
complex situation and whether it is capable of
substantiating the conclusions drawn from it.34
Despite the formula being repeated on several
occasions,35 ``academics and practitioners alike are
26 Ibid., para 58.
27 See, e.g., Case C-77/09, Gowan ComeÂrcio Internacional e
ServicË os Lda v. Ministero della Salute ECLI:EU:C:2010:803,
concerning whether a substance meets the safety requirements
of Council Directive 91/414/EEC concerning the Placing of
Plant Protection Products on the Market [1991] OJ L 230/1.
28 See, e.g., Case 42/84, Remia and Others v. Commission
EU:C:1985:327, para. 34.
29 C. Anderson, ``Contrasting Models of EU Administra-
tion in Judicial Review of Risk Regulation'' (2014) 51(2)
Common Market Law Review, pp. 424±454, at 434.
30 Case C-12/03 P, Tetra Laval ECLI:EU:C:2005:87. For an
examination of the Tetra Laval test and the distinction
between establishing the facts which are relevant in the
decision-making and the appraisal of these facts, and the
different review of the European courts, see M. Schimmel &
R. Widdershoven, ``Judicial Review after Tetra Laval: Some
Observations from a European Administrative Law Point of
View'', n. 9 above, pp. 51±78, at 61 and ff.
31 P. Craig, EU Administrative Law, 2nd edn (Oxford
University Press, 2012), pp. 415±416.
32 See the Tetra Laval case, n. 30 above.
33 Ibid, para. 39.
34 Ibid, para. 39. This test has been reiterated in a long line
of case law after that. See recently Case C-389/10 P, KME
Germany and others v. Commission: ECLI:EU:C:2011:816,
para. 121; Case T-177/13, TestBioTech eV and Others v.
Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2016:736 para. 79. For an exam-
ination of Tetra Laval and the subsequent case law, see A.
Meij ``Judicial Review in the EC Courts: Tetra Laval and
Beyond'', in O. Essens, A. Gerbrandy & S. Lavrijssen (eds),
National Courts and the Standard of Review in Competition
Law and Economic Regulation (Europa Law Publishing,
2009), pp. 8±21.
35 See, e.g., Case T-377/07, EvropaõÈki Dynamiki ± Proigmena
Systimata Tilepikoinonion Pliroforikis kai Tilematikis AE v.
Commission: ECLI:EU:T:2011:731, para. 22 and the case
law cited therein.
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still struggling to grasp fully under what circumstances
EU Courts are likely to take fault with the Commis-
sion's decision-making and what errors may strike a
fatal blow to the lawfulness of its analysis''.36 Notwith-
standing the elusiveness of this test, it can be established
that the European Courts are consistent on the necessity
of a thorough and careful examination of facts, where
their establishment is objectively difficult and it requires
expert knowledge.37 Furthermore, the control exercised
by the CJEU does not preclude establishing facts
independently or reviewing the facts established by the
EU authorities with regard to the content, rather than
only the procedure.38 On this basis, it has been argued
that the Court of Justice has moved from a mere
procedural review of discretionary decisions to a ``quasi-
substantive review of the scientific evidence relied upon
in the decision-making process''.39
Important for the purposes of the present analysis is
the fact that the CJEU applied the same test not only
to the economic field but also to that of the regulation
of risks to public health or the environment.40 A first
step towards a more thorough review of the discre-
tionary choices of the EU administration can be seen
in Pfizer, which concerned a challenge against a
measure withdrawing the authorization for an additive
to animal feeding stuffs.41 Again, while not formally
departing from the test of ``manifest error'', the
General Court (then called the Court of First Instance)
carried out a thorough evaluation to assess whether a
manifest error had been committed by the European
Commission. This same approach has been repeated in
later case law concerning the regulation of risks to
public health or the environment.42 Furthermore, in
the SchraÈder case concerning the application for a
plant variety right, the General Court (seized in first
instance in an action for annulment under Article 263
TFEU) used the Tetra Laval formula and stated that
this was the applicable standard of review for cases in
which the decision is the result of a complex economic
or technical assessment.43 The General Court moreover
added that the same standard would apply in cases
where technical complexity stems from ``appraisals in
other scientific domains, such as botany or genetics''.44
On the basis of this case law, it can be concluded that
the CJEU has not formally moved away from the
``manifest error'' threshold as a standard of review in
administrative decision-making. However, the case law
suggest that, in order to assess whether a manifest error
has been committed by the EU institutions, EU courts
are required to be able to assess the evidence submitted
and, arguably therefore, to access all necessary scientific
knowledge to do so. In the words of AG Kokott:
it would be an error to assume that the Commis-
sion's margin of discretion precludes the Commu-
nity Courts in any event from giving their own
analysis of the facts and the evidence. On the
contrary, it is essential for the Community Courts
to undertake such an assessment of their own where
they are assessing whether the factual material on
which the Commission's decision was based was
accurate, reliable, consistent and complete, and
whether this factual material was capable of
substantiating the conclusions the Commission
drew from it. Otherwise, the Community Courts
could not sensibly assess whether the Commission
had stayed within the limits of the margin of
discretion allowed to it or had committed a manifest
error of assessment.45
This test requires, as has been argued, ``a review of
factual accuracy, reliability, consistency and complete-
ness of evidence, and allows the court to assess
whether it serves as a sufficient basis for Commission's
conclusions''.46 This means that, when complex
evaluations are at stake, or inconclusive or contra-
dictory evidence is presented, the CJEU will examine
whether the evidence brought forward by the Commis-
sion is capable of constituting a proper basis for the
final decision.
The necessary corollary of this finding, on the basis
of the ``Upjohn equivalence'' presented above, is that
36 A. Kalintiri ``What's in a Name? The Marginal Standard
of Review of `Complex Economic Assessments' in EU
Competition Enforcement'' (2016) 53(5) Common Market
Law Review, pp. 1283±316, at 1285, with further references
on the debate surrounding the standard of review in
economic cases.
37 Case T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health SA v. Council of the
European Union ECLI:EU:T:2002:209, para. 172; see also
recently Case C-691/15 P, Commission v. BilbaõÂna de
Alquitranes and Others ECLI:EU:C:2017:882, para. 35.
38 Tetra Laval, n. 30 above, para 39. Of course, it is a
different story whether the EU courts do carry out this
review in practice and are equipped to do so. This
consideration is not relevant for the current investigation
and will not be explored further. See further Kalintiri, n. 36
above, pp. 1311±1312.
39 G.C. Leonelli, ``European Commission v. BilbaõÂna and
Others: The Fine Line Between Procedural and Substantive
Review in Cases Involving Complex Technical-Scientific
Evaluations'' (2018) Common Market Law Review (forth-
coming).
40 See Case T-475/07, Dow Agro Sciences Ltd and Others v.
Commission EU:T:2011:445, paras. 150153; Case T-257/07,
France v. Commission, EU:T:2011:444, para. 87.
41 Pfizer, n. 37 above.
42 Dow Agro Sciences, n. 40 above, paras. 150153; France v.
Commission, n. 40 above, para. 87.
43 Case T-187/06, Ralf SchraÈder v. Community Plant Variety
Office (CPVO), EU:T:2008:511, para. 61.
44 Ibid, para. 62.
45 Case C-413/06, P Bertelsmann AG and Sony Corporation
of America v. Independent Music Publishers and Labels
Association (Impala) ECLI:EU:C:2007:790, para. 240.
46 M. Baran, ``The Scope of EU Courts' Jurisdiction and
Review of Administrative Decisions: The Problem of
Intensity Control of Legality'', in C. Harlow, P. Leino &
G. della Cananea (eds), Research Handbook on EU
Administrative Law (Edward Elgar, 2017), pp. 292±315, at
311.
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this standard of review applies not only before the
European courts but also in domestic litigation.
Arguably, therefore, while not required to fully review
administrative decisions, national courts should never-
theless be equipped to assess all evidence submitted to
them and to determine whether the evidence provided
by the national authorities is capable of substantiating
the conclusions contained in the challenged decision.
Consequently, national courts should be able to obtain
the necessary support for these tasks. This conclusion
seems in line with the requirement, enunciated since
Upjohn, that national courts should be able to perform
a standard of review that allows them to effectively
apply the relevant EU law provisions.
III. The Legislative and Jurisprudential
Framework regarding the Standard
of Review and Access to Technical
Knowledge in Environmental Cases
3.1. The Aarhus requirements and the European case
law on the standard of review
The case law discussed above, including Upjohn, does
not specifically concern environmental policy. It is
therefore necessary to analyze the relevant secondary
EU rules and the applicable case law in this field to
examine whether more concrete (or possibly different)
requirements apply with regard to the standard of
review applicable in environmental litigation involving
EU law. In carrying out this analysis, the scope of the
examination needs to be extended to the international
level and in particular to the Aarhus Convention,47
which contains specific provisions on access to justice
in environmental matters.
As a starting point, it needs to be clarified that, to
date, there is no case law which explicitly and clearly
sets a minimum standard of review for national courts
in environmental litigation. Some indications of a
threshold can be found in the ruling in Standley.48 In
this case, the national court was concerned with the
designation of nitrate-vulnerable zones under the EU
Nitrates Directive.49 The applicants were farmers
seeking the annulment of the UK Government's
decision to designate certain areas as vulnerable
because of the restrictions that such designation would
impose on farmers. With regard to the applicable
standard of review, the court indicated that:
when national courts review the legality of measures
identifying waters affected by pollution [. . .] they
must take account of the wide discretion enjoyed by
the Member States which is inherent in the
complexity of the assessments required of them in
that context.50
This statement implicitly points to the ``manifest
error'' threshold which more clearly emerges from
the Upjohn string of case law.51
Moving to the examination of the legislative
framework, Article 9(2) of the Aarhus Convention
requires the possibility for national courts to review
the ``substantive and procedural legality'' of certain
decisions that are subject to the public participation
requirements mandated by the Convention itself.
Furthermore, Article 9(4) contains the requirement
to ensure an ``adequate and effective remedy'' to
censor violations of environmental law. These require-
ments are incorporated literally in the relevant
Directives transposing Article 9(2) of the Aarhus
Convention into the EU legal order, namely Article
11 of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
Directive52 and Article 25 of the Industrial Emissions
Directive.53 However, neither of these provisions gives
clear guidance on the intensity of the review of
substantive and procedural legality that needs to be
undertaken.
Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention, which
provides for access to justice with respect to all
environmental law violations (and is thus wider in
scope than Article 9(2)) does not make any reference
to standard of review, nor does it provide for an
obligation for courts to assess the substantive and
procedural legality of decisions taken in the field of
environmental law. This phrase is currently only to be
found in Article 13 of the EU's Environmental
Liability Directive,54 which is technically unconnected
to the transposition of the Aarhus Convention, yet
within the field of application of its Article 9(3).55
Article 13 of the Directive lays down a requirement for
47 n. 10 above.
48 Case C-293/97, The Queen v. Secretary of State for the
Environment and Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food,
ex parte H.A. Standley and Others and D.G.D. Metson and
Others: ECLI:EU:C:1999:215, para. 37 (Standley).
49 Directive 91/676/EEC concerning the Protection of
Waters against Pollution Caused by Nitrates from Agricul-
tural Sources [1991] OJ L375/1.
50 Standley and Others, n. 48 above, para. 37.
51 See C. Hilson, ``Review of Legality of Member States
Discretion under Directives'', in T. Tridimas & P. Nebbia,
(eds) European Union Law for the Twenty-First Century
(Hart, 2004), pp. 223±238, at 236.
52 Directive 2011/92/EU on the Effects of Certain Public
and Private Projects on the Environment (Codification)
[2011] OJ L26/1 as amended by Directive 2014/52/EU [2014]
OJ L124/1.
53 Directive 2010/75/EU on Industrial Emissions (Inte-
grated Pollution Prevention and Control) [2010] OJ L334/
17.
54 Directive 2004/35/CE on Environmental Liability with
regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental
Damage [2004] OJ L143/56.
55 On this point see further, M. Eliantonio, ``The Procedur-
alisation of EU Environmental Legislation: International
Pressures, Some Victories and Some Way to Go'' (2015) 8(1)
Review of European Administrative Law, pp. 99±123, at 114
ff.
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access to justice to review ``the procedural and
substantive legality'' of decisions, which are the same
terms as used in Article 9(2) of the Aarhus Conven-
tion.
According to the Aarhus Convention Implementa-
tion Guide, moreover:
[A]lthough no explicit reference to substantive or
procedural legality is made in paragraph 3, a Party
cannot limit the scope of review under this
provision to either procedural or substantive
legality. Rather, the review procedures for acts
and omissions challenged must enable both the
substantive as well as the procedural legality of the
alleged violation to be challenged.56
The Aarhus Implementation Guide thus suggests that
the standard of review to be applied in the context of
Article 9(3) is identical to the one to be applied in the
context of Article 9(2) of the Convention.
Interestingly, while the CJEU on many occasions
has interpreted the requirements of access to justice
enshrined in Article 9(2) and 9(4) of the Aarhus
Convention from the perspective of standing and costs
of proceedings, there has been no extensive discussion
on the standard of review mandated by these provi-
sions. To date, the only ruling shedding any light on
this issue is Altrip.57
In Altrip, the CJEU ruled that the right to challenge
a decision taken in the context of a decision-making
process during which an environmental impact assess-
ment should have been carried out, could not be
limited by national law solely to cases in which the
legality of this decision is challenged on the ground
that no environmental impact assessment has been
carried out. According to the Court of Justice,
excluding access to justice in cases where, ``having
been carried out, an environmental impact assessment
is found to be vitiated by defects ± even serious defects
± would render largely nugatory''58 the provisions of
the EIA Directive governing public participation. To
an extent, this position has been reiterated in
Commission v. Germany,59 in which the Court stated
that the objective of Article 11 of the EIA Directive:
[I]s not only to ensure that the litigant has the
broadest possible access to review by the courts but
also to ensure that that review covers both the
substantive and procedural legality of the contested
decision in its entirety.60
In conclusion, it seems that, even after Altrip,
Commission v. Germany and East Sussex, the standard
of review has not moved from the ``manifest error''
threshold. However, these cases do clarify that
national courts must be able to review the technical
assessments (in the relevant cases, the environmental
impact assessment) on which the challenged decisions
are based with reference to all aspects of legality, not
only the procedural ones. Furthermore, any standard
of review must be sufficient to enable the national
court to effectively apply the relevant EU environ-
mental law.
It could therefore be argued that, while not
prescribing explicitly a certain standard of review,
the international and EU framework requires national
courts to be able to review the substantive legality of
an environmental decision and to provide an effective
remedy. This implies an expectation that national
courts be able to understand the technical aspects and
background of the decision at issue. To meet this
expectation, national courts must therefore have
access to the scientific knowledge necessary to do so.
This conclusion, however, does not seem to be fully
supported by the recent European Commission Com-
munication on Access to Justice,61 a non-binding
instrument issued in order to provide guidance to
national courts in the absence of transposition by the
EU of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention. With
regard to the requirement to review substantive
legality, and specifically, to review the facts of the
case, the Communication states that:
National courts are not generally required to carry
out any information-gathering or factual investiga-
tions of their own. However, in order to ensure an
effective review of the decisions, acts or omissions at
stake, a minimum standard has to be applied to the
examination of the facts in order to ensure that a
claimant can exercise his or her right to ask for a
review in an effective manner also so far as the
examination of facts is concerned. If a national
court could never review the facts on which the
administration based its decision, this could, from
the outset, prevent a claimant from presenting
effectively a potentially justified claim.62
The Communication thus makes clear that no
information-gathering activity is required of national
courts under EU law. This seems to contradict the
position of the Court of Justice concerning the
necessity to:
establish whether the evidence relied on is factually
accurate, reliable and consistent but also whether
the evidence contains all the information which
must be taken into account in order to assess a
complex situation and whether it is capable of
substantiating the conclusions drawn from it.63
Furthermore, it can be argued that, while the
Communication states that a minimum standard has
to be applied to the examination of the facts, it does
56 The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide, 2nd
edn (2014), p.199.
57 Case C-72/12, Gemeinde Altrip and Others v. Land
Rheinland-Pfalz: ECLI:EU:C:2013:71.
58 Ibid., para. 37.
59 Case C-137/14, Commission v. Germany EU:C:2015:683.
60 Ibid., para. 80.
61 Communication from the Commission, ``Commission
Notice on Access to Justice in Environmental Matters'',
C(2017) 2616 final.
62 Ibid., para 137.
63 Tetra Laval, n. 30 above, para. 39.
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not provide any guidance as to this standard. The
following sentence of the Communication alludes to
circumstances in which a court could ``never'' review
facts, suggesting that if such a scenario is averted, the
minimum standard required by EU law is met. Hence,
it seems that the Communication sets a lower standard
of review than Upjohn and lately East Sussex. While
the case law of the CJEU requires a standard of review
which, holistically, ensures the effective application of
EU law, the Communication seems to suggest that the
mere possibility to review facts may be sufficient to
ensure compatibility with EU law.
It can be questioned whether this position supports
the actual achievement of effective judicial protection
in environmental matters. If the minimum requirement
under EU law is the mere possibility to review facts,
but EU law does not, at the same time, require
national courts to understand the very facts under
review through accessing the necessary scientific
knowledge, this review arguably becomes largely
useless for applicants.
TheWaddenzee case64 illustrates the problem. In the
context of Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive,65 the
CJEU ruled that competent public authorities may
only authorize an activity in a protected Natura 2000
site where, taking into account the conclusions of an
appropriate assessment, no reasonable scientific doubt
remains that, in the light of the site's conservation
objectives, the activity will not adversely affect the
integrity of the site. This seems to imply that, when
called upon to review a decision authorizing such an
activity, the national court has to determine whether
or not the scientific evidence relied upon by the public
authority leaves no reasonable doubt. One may
legitimately wonder how a national court is expected
to carry out this assessment if no access to scientific
knowledge is secured under national law and is not, at
the same time, required by EU law.
This difference in legal requirements between the
case law of the Court of Justice and the Commission
Communication clearly does not make the life of
national courts easier and will not contribute to foster
legal certainty in the enforcement of EU environ-
mental law.
3.2. The lack of guidance on access to scientific
knowledge in environmental litigation
If the question of the standard of review required in
environmental cases has not been subject to much case
law, questions regarding the procedures to secure
national courts' access to scientific knowledge have
never been tackled by the CJEU.
The first, and to the date also the last, attempt to
shed some light on this issue was made by an Italian
administrative court in Comitato di Coordinamento per
la Difesa della Cava.66 The claim concerned a measure
by which the Region of Lombardia had resolved upon
locating a waste discharge plant for solid urban waste
in a municipality within the region. A number of
individuals had instituted proceedings against this
decision, claiming that it undermined their right to
environmental protection.
The Regional Administrative Court of Lombardia
found that the national rule67 (implementing the
relevant provisions of EU law, i.e. the Waste Frame-
work Directive)68 provided for the disposal of waste to
be carried out almost exclusively by means of creating
a waste discharge plant. In the light of these findings,
the Italian court expressed doubts as to the compat-
ibility of these rules with EU law, which required the
Member States to adopt appropriate measures to
encourage the prevention, recycling and processing of
waste.
Consequently, the Italian court decided to order a
stay of the proceedings and refer a preliminary question
to the Court of Justice concerning the direct effect of
the provisions of EU law allegedly violated by the
conduct of the Region. At the same time, the Regional
Administrative Court of Lombardia took the opportu-
nity to ask the Court of Justice a question concerning
the evidence regime in Italian administrative proceed-
ings and its compatibility with EU law. In particular,
the Italian court asked the Court of Justice whether EU
rights had to be protected in national courts with the
possibility of requesting a technical assessment from an
independent expert, or whether a report submitted by
the administrative authorities could be considered as
sufficient (notwithstanding the fact that the adminis-
tration was itself party to the dispute).69
The Court of Justice, however, ``disappointed'' the
expectations of the Italian court and did not answer all
questions referred to it. Having considered that the
relevant provisions of EU law at issue lacked direct
effect, it abstained from tackling the question on the
evidence regime. Nevertheless, a ``European'' point of
view on this issue may still be found in the non-binding
opinion issued by the Advocate General on this case.70
64 Case C-127/02, Landelijke Vereniging tot Behoud van de
Waddenzee and Nederlandse Vereniging tot Bescherming van
Vogels v. Staatssecretaris van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en
Visserij, ECLI:EU:C:2004:482 (Waddenzee).
65 Directive 92/43/EEC on the Conservation of Natural
Habitats and of Wild Fauna and Flora [1992] OJ L206/7.
66 Case C-236/92, Comitato di Coordinamento per la Difesa
della Cava and others v. Regione Lombardia and others:
ECLI:EU:C:1994:60.
67 Presidential Decree of 10 Sept. 1982, No. 915 GU of 15
Dec. 1982, No. 343.
68 Directive 75/442/EEC on Waste [1975] OJ L194/39.
69 For an analysis of the Italian rules on evidence applicable
at that time and their subsequent evolution, see: M.
Eliantonio, Europeanisation of Administrative Justice? The
Influence of the ECJ's Case Law in Italy, Germany and
England (Europa Law Publishing, 2008), pp. 181 ff, and R.
Caranta in this Special Issue.
70 Opinion of AG Darmon in Case C-236/92, Comitato di
Coordinamento per la Difesa della Cava and others v.
Regione Lombardia and Others ECLI:EU:C:1993:893.
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In his opinion, Advocate General Darmon states
that, where a provision of EU law confers rights,
``genuine protection for them necessarily implies that
experts appointed by the court must be independent so
that the inquiries can be undertaken with rigorous
impartiality and neutrality''.71 In particular, the
Advocate General expresses the opinion that the
principle of effective judicial protection cannot be
reconciled with the lack of any guarantee of neutrality
on the part of the expert, whose role is to provide
clarification for the court with absolute impartiality,
when the expert is employed by the administration and
the latter is a party to the proceedings.
Thus, he concludes that, with regard to the national
procedural rules at issue, the principle of effective
judicial protection:
is [. . .] compromised since, principally in technical
matters where the administration is the other party,
an ordinary individual has no standing to challenge
what the administration says. The expert must thus
reflect the independence of the judge, the need for
which has been recognized by this Court.72
The issue of expert evidence has not been the
explicit subject matter of rulings by the ECJ after the
Comitato di Coordinamento case. However, it is could
be foreseen that, should a question similar to the one
posed by the national court in the Comitato di
Coordinamento case be asked, the Court of Justice
would be likely to follow the Advocate General's view
and determine that the principle of effective judicial
protection requires the procedural possibility for
national courts to have access to independent and
impartial technical experts, who are able assess the
technical choices made by the national authorities.
IV.Conclusions
The question of courts' access to scientific knowledge
in environmental litigation has not been subject to
much doctrinal discussion or jurisprudential examina-
tion. The issue is deeply connected to the standard of
review which national courts feel entitled or obliged to
perform when EU environmental law is at stake.
The question of the standard of review mandated by
EU law (and in particular the principle of effective
judicial protection) was tackled by the Court of Justice
in the Upjohn case and has, since then, never been
explicitly revisited. The case makes a significant
connection between the national and the EU standard
of review and inextricably links the two. While the
standard of review performed at the European level
has never officially departed by the ``manifest error''
threshold, the European courts have, in the course of
the years, made clear that this threshold entails
checking the reliability and accuracy of the evidence
presented before them. On the basis of the Upjohn
equivalence, this threshold should equally be applic-
able before national courts, requiring, by consequence,
the latter to have adequate procedural means (within
the framework of national procedural autonomy) to
access the scientific knowledge necessary to review the
technical choices of the public authorities.
Specifically in environmental matters, the Court of
Justice also never ruled clearly with regard to the
required standard of review, but Articles 9(2) and Art.
9(4) of the Aarhus Convention (together with their
transposition in EU secondary law), and the Altrip
ruling seem to point in the direction that all aspects of
legality of a decision must be assessed. This conclusion
does not contradict Upjohn, and also does not set a
higher threshold: all aspects of legality must be
analyzed by the national courts to assess whether the
national authorities committed a manifest error. In
any event, the legislative and jurisprudential frame-
work applicable in environmental matters seems to
require that the national courts have access to the
necessary technical knowledge to perform their
assessments.
If manifest error is the threshold, and courts should
be able to access the scientific knowledge required to
control the administration's assessments, that last
point is whether there are any EU requirements on
the manner in which this knowledge must be accessed.
The Court of Justice never provided any guidance on
the availability and type of expert knowledge that
must be made available in national proceedings. In
Comitato di Coordinamento case, however, the Advo-
cate General concluded that the non-availability of
independent and impartial technical expertise is a
breach of the principle of effective judicial protection.
It can be expected that the Court will agree should a
preliminary question to this effect be posed before it.
The conclusions do not however find full support in
the recent Commission Communication on Access to
Justice, where the Commission seems to indicate that
the mere possibility for courts to review facts is enough
to ensure compliance with EU law. One can question
in how far this position fully ensures the realization of
the principle of effective judicial protection in case the
national court is able to review the facts on which the
administration based its decision but is not able (and is
not required under EU law) to access the necessary
scientific knowledge to be able to effectively carry out
that review.
Finally, it should be noted that the legislative and
jurisprudential framework presented above certainly
does not set a clear standard and guidance for national
courts. As a consequence, different national solutions
on the applicable standard of review and access to
scientific knowledge may all be acceptable under EU
law ± provided that the court is able to assess whether
a ``manifest error'' has been committed or review the
factual background of the dispute. The ensuing
71 Ibid., para. 47.
72 Ibid., para. 50.
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questions are, therefore, firstly, whether there are any
national solutions, which are below what is acceptable
in terms of effective judicial protection and, secondly,
whether the existence of (acceptable) different national
solutions impair the uniform application of EU law.
Comparative research is needed to answer both of
these points.73
73 See, on the first question, especially the contributions of
Bar and to some extent that of Caranta in this Special Issue,
and the contribution of Ryall, n. 20 above. On the second
question, see the Foreword by T. Paloniitty and M.
Eliantonio.
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